

# After Action Review

## *Humboldt-Toiyabe NATIONAL FOREST*

Incident Name:  Cannon Initial Attack and Extended Attack

Date: 06-20-2002 \_\_\_\_\_ Class: \_\_\_\_\_  
CREW: \_\_\_\_\_ IC: \_\_\_\_\_

Critiqued By:

- |                 |           |           |
|-----------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1. <u> Gary</u> | 8. _____  | 15. _____ |
| Schiff _____    |           |           |
| 2. <u> Greg</u> | 9. _____  | 16. _____ |
| Vergari _____   |           |           |
| 3. _____        | 10. _____ | 17. _____ |
| 4. _____        | 11. _____ | 18. _____ |
| 5. _____        | 12. _____ | 19. _____ |
| 6. _____        | 13. _____ | 20. _____ |
| 7. _____        | 14. _____ | 21. _____ |

The purpose of this critique is to identify any areas where the Fire Orders, the 18 Fire Situations That Shout Watch Out, or LCES may not have been given proper consideration during the incident.  
Comment where applicable.

Critique Leader Signature  /s/ Gary Schiff \_\_\_\_\_ Date  6/21/02 \_\_\_\_\_

Reviewed By: \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

***Diagram of fire:***



## *After Action Review*

### **What was planned?**

Review the primary objectives and expected action plan.

Control the **non-fire** situation – thirty Marines without training or PPE were attempting to suppress the fire. A two-wheel drive ambulance was blocking access for H-T engines on a one-lane four-wheel drive road. A volunteer fire department engine was dispatched and arrived prior to the H-T engine and helitack crew. Individuals in this engine were not wildland firefighting trained and did not have PPE.

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Direct attack - Anchor and flank the fire and call in tankers and air support to knock down the head of the fire. Dispatch sent “moderate “ response per pre-programmed dispatch directions.

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### **What actually happened?**

Review the day’s actions:

- Identify and discuss effective and non-effective performance.

Non –fire situation was handled effectively. Marines were relocated out of harms way. Ambulance and Local fire engine were removed from the scene however both of these efforts took some time to accomplish.

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Tanker did not arrive on scene for over two hours from initial request. Tanker was staged in Battle Mountain. Those present on IA believe fire may have been stopped if tanker had arrived in 20 minutes as is typically the case when tanker is staged at Minden or Stead.

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Type III IC assigned. Decision made to request a Type II team.

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- Identify barriers that were encountered and how they were handled.
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Local RFD responded without proper PPE

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Local Ambulance responded – drove to incident and blocked road

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Thirty Marines were present without training and PPE

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- Discuss all actions that were not standard operation procedure, or those that presented safety problems.

Untrained Marines without PPE, local ambulance obstructing traffic and local VFD without training/PPE

Also local ambulance would have had difficulty responding to other emergencies in north Mono County given ambulance location off-highway.

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**Why did it happen?**

Discuss the reasons for ineffective or unsafe performance. Concentrate on WHAT, not WHO, is right.

Additional training/coordination needed with Marines and Mono County

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**What can we do next time?**

Determine lessons learned and how to apply them in the future.

Contact Marine Commander and pursue fire fighter training, PPE and describe Incident Command Organization.

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Contact Mono County Dispatch and review dispatching procedures for wildland firefighting in order to minimize response time and send appropriate resources. Coordination with Minden should also be a discussion topic.

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Contact Mono County Emergency Services and offer training/PPE for wildland firefighting; review ambulance response procedures and appropriate staging parameters on forest.

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Contact State Fire Board of Directors re: tanker staging. Local FMO's provide criteria for local staging of tankers and ensure a tanker is staged on the Sierra Front when conditions warrant.

Provide earlier air attack size-up of the fire the following morning as requested.

COMMEND ALL INVOLVED FOR HEADS-UP RESPONSE TO COMPLEX SITUATION.

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## ***FIRE ORDERS***

OBSERVED	NOT OBSERVED	FIRE ORDERS
		F. Fight fire aggressively but provide for safety first.
		I. Initiate all action based on current and expected fire behavior.
		R. Recognize current weather conditions and obtain forecasts.
		E. Ensure instructions are given and understood.
		O. Obtain current information on fire status.
		R. Remain in communication with crew members, your supervisor and adjoining forces.
		D. Determine safety zones and escape routes.
		E. Establish lookouts in potentially hazardous situations.
		R. Retain control at all times.
		S. Stay alert, keep calm, think clearly, act decisively.

## ***18 FIRE SITUATIONS THAT SHOUT "WATCH OUT"***

OBSERVED	NOT OBSERVED	SITUATION
		1. Fire not scouted and sized up.
		2. In country not seen in daylight.
		3. Safety zones and escape routes not identified.
		4. Unfamiliar with weather and local factors influencing fire behavior.
		5. Uninformed on strategy, tactics and hazards.
		6. Instructions and assignments not clear.
		7. No communication link with crew members/supervisor.
		8. Constructing line without safe anchor point.
		9. Building fireline downhill with fire below.
		10. Attempting frontal assault on fire.
		11. Unburned fuel between you and the fire.
		12. Cannot see main fire, not in contact with anyone who can.
		13. On a hillside where rolling material can ignite fuel below.
		14. Weather is getting hotter and drier.
		15. Wind increases and/or changes direction.
		16. Getting frequent spot fires across line.
		17. Terrain and fuels make escape to safety zones difficult.
		18. Taking a nap near the fireline.

## *LCES*

<b>ELEMENT</b>	<b>FEATURE</b>	<b>YES</b>	<b>NO</b>
<b><i>LOOKOUTS</i></b>	EXPERIENCED/COMPETENT/TRUSTED		
	ENOUGH LOOKOUTS AT GOOD VANTAGE POINTS		
	KNOWLEDGE OF CREW LOCATIONS		
	KNOWLEDGE OF ESCAPE AND SAFETY LOCATIONS		
	KNOWLEDGE OF DISENGAGEMENT TRIGGER POINTS		
	MAP/WEATHER KIT/WATCH/IAP		
<b><i>COMMUNICATIONS</i></b>	RADIO FREQUENCIES CONFIRMED		
	BACKUP PROCEDURES AND CHECK-IN TIMES ESTABLISHED		
	PROVIDE UPDATED ON ANY SITUATION CHANGE		
	SOUND ALARM EARLY, NOT LATE		
<b><i>ESCAPE ROUTES</i></b>	MORE THAN ONE ESCAPE ROUTE		
	AVOID UPHILL ESCAPE ROUTES		
	SCOUTED: LOOSE SOILS/ROCKS/VEGETATION		
	TIMED: SLOWEST PERSON/FATIGUE AND TEMPERATURE FACTORS		
	MARKED: FLAGGED FOR DAY OR NIGHT		
	EVALUATE: ESCAPE TIME VS. RATE OF SPREAD		
	VEHICLES PARKED FOR ESCAPE		
<b><i>SAFETY ZONES</i></b>	SURVIVABLE WITHOUT A FIRE SHELTER		
	BACK INTO CLEAN BURN		
	NATURAL FEATURES: ROCK AREAS/WATER/MEADOWS		
	CONSTRUCTED SITES: CLEARCUTS/ROADS/HELISPOTS		
	SCOUTED FOR SIZE AND HAZARDS		
	LARGER SAFETY ZONE: UPSLOPE/DOWNWIND/HEAVY FUELS		