

After Action Review

BOISE NATIONAL FOREST

Incident Name: Big Guy #155
Date: 8/25/02
CREW: _____

Class: D 245 acres
IC: Jason Greenlee


Participants:

- | | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1. Jason Greenlee - IC | 8. _____ | 15. _____ |
| 2. Nate Lefever - DIVS | 9. _____ | 16. _____ |
| 3. Mike Diem – District Safety | 10. _____ | 17. _____ |
| 4. Eldon Alexander - DIVS | 11. _____ | 18. _____ |
| 5. Navajo Scouts #70 | 12. _____ | 19. _____ |
| 6. Ronn Julian – District Ranger | 13. _____ | 20. _____ |
| 7. _____ | 14. _____ | 21. _____ |

The purpose of this critique is to identify any areas where the Fire Orders, the 18 Fire Situations That Shout Watch Out, or LCES may not have been given proper consideration during the incident.
Comment where applicable.

Critique Leader Signature R F Julian Date 8/25/02
Reviewed By: _____ Date _____

Diagram of Fire



After Action Review

What was planned?

Review the primary objectives and expected action plan.

Objective was to contain the fire with available resources which included 5 crews, a type I Helicopter and a Type II helicopter (both on short leash) as there were also needed on other Incidents and IA within the Garden Valley complex. IC was also responsible for the Little Guy fire (2 ac.) located ½ mile to SW of incident 155.

What actually happened?

Review the day's actions:

- Identify and discuss effective and non-effective performance.

Overhead personnel assigned to fire were very resourceful. They were assigned as a stand alone division of the complex. Once on scene, they organized as an IC and three DIVS (a third DIVS was striped from the Black Mountain IHC). This action worked very well as it provided for overhead at the helispot/camp and on the fireline. The IC could focus on both fires and filled the gap for the lack of helitak personnel at the helispot.

Personnel assigned to fire did not have a pocket card illustrating BI for the north zone of the Boise National Forest. IC was briefed on PC and given a copy to incorporate into his next AM briefing.

- Identify barriers that were encountered and how they were handled.

IC did not have a clear picture of the overall complex and was hesitant to order additional crews/resources not knowing drawdown effect on other fires. In addition, he did not feel he had adequate room for more crews at spike camp location.

IC did order additional helitak to cover needs at helispot. Order was filled on 7/29.

IR version and GPS version of fire perimeter did not match what crews were mapping. IC relied on crew versions of map.

Loss of Type I helicopter resulted in perimeter increase (30 acres) on 7/28. That scenario could be repeated. Type II helicopter was not nearly as effective nor accurate with drops. Redirect of Type I helicopter did not occur during 7/29 shift, thus allowing IC to work towards achievement of objective by focusing on hot sections of unlined fire perimeter.

- Discuss all actions that were not standard operation procedure, or those that presented safety problems.

Shortage of crews did not provide for line improvement nor patrol after initial construction. There was some spotting across the line along the NW flank as Diem and Julian walked the line. There were no personnel in this area. Discussed w/IC at 1600. Suggested more crews or observers to cover this situation. Escape Routes were uphill, not flagged and were limited to one for the Navajo crew. However, the black was adequate and easily located.

Mix up in orders resulted in a delay in deployment of pumps. All necessary hose and fittings were not available.

Helicopters were not able to work on air to ground frequency as it was very busy with

traffic on other fires.

Chainsaws and fallers were limited in numbers. This was most evident in the Spike Camp which had not been snagged prior to setting up camp. There were numerous, hazardous snags within the general and sleeping areas. IC and DIVS indicated they had not given adequate consideration to this hazard. This also may have been a factor in initial attack when the helispot was cut in. This was a very dense canopy with multiple snags. It appears that some trees greater than 4 inches in diameter were cut without use of a face cut/back cut technique. These trees appeared to have been dropped using a single backcut only. Some firefighters were wearing KEVLAR fire pants (not approved).

Why did it happen?

Discuss the reasons for ineffective or unsafe performance. Concentrate on WHAT, not WHO, is right.

There were no observed instances of unsafe performance other than lack of resources and failure to drop snags in camp area. All personnel were dialed in on objectives and briefings at Helispot in the AM.

Squad from Navajo Scouts #70 were quizzed on safety zones, escape routes and were observed exercising proper precautions when torching was occurring. They did patrol/grid outside the line after torching. One request they had was LESS MILK and SEND BROCCALI as they could not digest milk and got their calcium from broccali.

All water drops from the helicopters were directed by a ground contact. There was no free lancing by helicopter pilots.

Crews were taking weather readings on a regular basis and broadcasting on tactical frequency.

What can we do next time?

Determine lessons learned and how to apply them in the future.

IC should order additional resources (crews and fallers) based on the needs of the incident.

Operations suggest to IC that additional resources would be advisable.

Operations give IC some assurance on availability of additional resources.

IC give consideration for second spike camp location if space is limiting factor at initial camp location.

FIRE ORDERS

OBSERVED	NOT OBSERVED	FIRE ORDERS
x		F. Fight fire aggressively but provide for safety first.
x		I. Initiate all action based on current and expected fire behavior.
x		R. Recognize current weather conditions and obtain forecasts.
x		E. Ensure instructions are given and understood.
x		O. Obtain current information on fire status.
x		R. Remain in communication with crewmembers, your supervisor and adjoining forces.
x		D. Determine safety zones and escape routes.
x		E. Establish lookouts in potentially hazardous situations.
x		R. Retain control at all times.
x		S. Stay alert, keep calm, think clearly, and act decisively.

18 FIRE SITUATIONS THAT SHOUT "WATCH OUT"

OBSERVED	NOT OBSERVED	SITUATION
x		1. Fire not scouted and sized up.
x		2. In country not seen in daylight.
x		3. Safety zones and escape routes not identified.
x		4. Unfamiliar with weather and local factors influencing fire behavior.
x		5. Uninformed on strategy, tactics and hazards.
x		6. Instructions and assignments not clear.
x		7. No communication link with crew members/supervisor.
x		8. Constructing line without safe anchor point.
x		9. Building fireline downhill with fire below.
x		10. Attempting frontal assault on fire.
x		11. Unburned fuel between you and the fire.
		12. Cannot see main fire, not in contact with anyone who can.
x		13. On a hillside where rolling material can ignite fuel below.
x		14. Weather is getting hotter and drier.
x		15. Wind increases and/or changes direction.
x		16. Getting frequent spot fires across line.
x		17. Terrain and fuels make escape to safety zones difficult.

LCES

ELEMENT	FEATURE	YES	NO
<i>LOOKOUTS</i>	EXPERIENCED/COMPETENT/TRUSTED	x	
	ENOUGH LOOKOUTS AT GOOD VANTAGE POINTS	x	
	KNOWLEDGE OF CREW LOCATIONS	x	
	KNOWLEDGE OF ESCAPE AND SAFETY LOCATIONS	x	
	KNOWLEDGE OF DISENGAGEMENT TRIGGER POINTS	x	
	MAP/WEATHER KIT/WATCH/IAP	x	
<i>COMMUNICATIONS</i>	RADIO FREQUENCIES CONFIRMED	x	
	BACKUP PROCEDURES AND CHECK-IN TIMES ESTABLISHED	x	
	PROVIDE UPDATED ON ANY SITUATION CHANGE	x	
	SOUND ALARM EARLY, NOT LATE	x	
<i>ESCAPE ROUTES</i>	MORE THAN ONE ESCAPE ROUTE		x
	AVOID UPHILL ESCAPE ROUTES		x
	SCOUTED: LOOSE SOILS/ROCKS/VEGETATION	x	
	TIMED: SLOWEST PERSON/FATIGUE AND TEMPERATURE FACTORS	x	
	MARKED: FLAGGED FOR DAY OR NIGHT		x
	EVALUATE: ESCAPE TIME VS. RATE OF SPREAD	?	
	VEHICLES PARKED FOR ESCAPE	N/A	
<i>SAFETY ZONES</i>	SURVIVABLE WITHOUT A FIRE SHELTER	x	
	BACK INTO CLEAN BURN	x	
	NATURAL FEATURES: ROCK AREAS/WATER/MEADOWS	x	
	CONSTRUCTED SITES: CLEARCUTS/ROADS/HELISPOTS	x	
	SCOUTED FOR SIZE AND HAZARDS	x	
	LARGER SAFETY ZONE: UPSLOPE/DOWNWIND/HEAVY FUELS	x	