

## Notes - FAST team, Big Wash Fire, Cedar City Utah.

Team formed on the morning of 6/10, 2002, members are Jim Morrison, FS R-4 Aviation Safety Officer, Greg Vergeri, FS R-4 Fire Safety Officer, Dan Symmes, BLM Salt Lake FO Fuels Specialist, and John Burke, BLM State Aviation Manager, Utah. Greg Vergeri and Dan Symmes will focus on ground operations, Jim Morrison and John Burke will focus on aviation operations, Jim Morrison is the team lead.

Traveled to Cedar City, in-briefed with Paul Hefner, his Type I team is taking over the fire on 6/11 from Paul Broyles Type II team..

### 6/11 Aviation Concerns/Observations:

- #1. Morning briefing 6/11 at ATB, no IAP available, Type I helicopter crews and manager not informed of morning briefing at ATB.
- #2. Heavy helicopters working out of the Cedar City airport, no helibase manager assigned to the airport location (one has been on order since?), concern about operating without having completed helibase checklist.
- #3. Heavy helicopters hot-refueling as SOP, concern about applicability of this, question as to whether contract language allows for hot-refueling as normal SOP.
- #4. Air to ground frequency was busy and jammed up most of the day 6/10.
- #5. No hazard maps at heavy helibase.

Corrective actions taken or mitigation measures for concerns and observations listed above:

- #1. Air Ops delivered IAP to ATB and airport/Type I helibase at 1030, 6/11, and invited h/c crews and manager to attend briefings at the ATB
- #2. Helibase manager on order.
- #3. Hot-refueling risk evaluated, IHOG, contract and vendors operations specifications all checked for applicability of hot-refueling, all in order.
- #4. Another air to ground frequency assigned on 6/11.
- #5. Hazard maps given to Type I h/c manager.

Kudo's - Morning brief at ATB a strong emphasis on safety was made, just say no, etc.

Air to air victor radio traffic between air attack and all operating aircraft smooth and consistent.

6/12

Went to morning brief Type 2,3 Helibase. Briefing good.

Visited Type 1 Helibase (Appendix F: of IHOG Briefing checklist) had not been completed.

Visited Tanker base and briefed Lead and Tanker base.

Revisited Type 2,3 Helibase and addressed Load Calculations.

## Ground Operations

### Concerns/Observations:

#1. Transition briefing from Type II to Type I IMT wasn't crisp, wasn't clean. Delivery, background noise, couldn't hear, etc.

#2. Crews that were interviewed on 6/11, briefings were adequate.

#3. Observed division briefing after main morning briefing. IRPG not being used at briefing to ensure compliance of all checklist briefing items.

#4. Contract ambulance crew at 3 Peaks spike camp had not seen an IAP since 6/9.

#5. Two contract engine crews from Snake River did not know what the IRPG was, had never seen one.

#6. On 6/10 signing/directions to ICP inadequate, map wrong, etc. Met other lost individuals on mountain top.

#7 Attended morning operations pre-briefing and told the Operations Section how to use the IRPG for briefing.

#8 During briefing Branch2 told DIVS to use IRPG.

#9 Checked 2 individuals and one Crew on work- rest. Individuals and crew were all outside of the 2 to 1 work-rest policy. A meeting with Paul Hefner on 6/12 with Ed Hollenshead and came up with the notes listed below.

Kudo's - GSUL had a safety message posted for all drivers. Division C & E briefing Div Sup mentioned safety was #1 priority, will not break the 2-1 work-rest guidelines, and identified the

need to establish safety routes, wanted to know who had medical problems if any and any EMT's available on the division.

Corrective actions taken or mitigation measures for concerns and observations listed above:

#1 Morning briefing on 6/12 was much better due to the Type 1 Team getting organized at new camp.

#2, 3. Talked to many individuals and the Team about how to use the IRPG. Gave examples at briefing.

#4 Informed Planning that spike camp may not be getting IAP's

#5 Will send out message to Teams that contractors need to get the new IRPG's ( Regional Wildland Fire Safety Officer)

#6 Informed IC about road signing.

#9 see information below

The following Notes are from a conversation with the IC regarding the challenges posed by implementation of Thirtymile Policies.

- Vulnerable in that IC seldom knows who has been adequately briefed. Inter-personal willingness to listen and pass information is outside the control space of the IC.
- Are municipal fire departments and other non-federal cooperators willing to abide by policies? Particularly difficult in WUI fires of FS or multiple jurisdictions, where FS is principal player.
  - Unknowns are due to the absence of personal responsibility and accountability.
  - Often receive complaints following participation in an "unsafe action." Every employee has the right to refuse an assignment, and the obligation to make it known before the assignment.

Issue – Management of Work:Rest:

- Individuals still have the responsibility to manage their work:rest cycles~ through exchange of information with supervisors and overhead, assistance in planning rest periods in view of crew condition or cycle. Individuals are accountable to identify when cycles are exceeded, to request pre-approval for exceedence, to identify opportunities to adjust cycles, etc..
  - Incident processes (those under the IC's authority) for managing work / rest cycles are different than local unit processes (FMO and HR).
  - IC and General Staff will randomly review time sheets to assure compliance. Results may require more in-depth analysis of function, location, supervision, and other causal factors.
  - Time recorders will flag timesheets that have > 16 hours of work time and / or < 8 hours of rest between work periods.

- IC's can utilize the concept of "ordered rest" to facilitate "coyote" tactics. Must be documented on CTR with explanation included in Incident Package.
- CTRs (with associated documentation) will be required for all fires, regardless of type, under this scenario.
- Long term, effective policy implementation will require individuals to be responsible and held accountable for management of personal and crew work:rest.
- Recommendation: Modify OF-288 to provide room for documentation ("ordered rest", pre- approval for shift-length or w/r exceedence, etc.).
- Emphasis must remain on the pre-approval of exceedence justifications~ probably the weakest link in documentation.

Summary - the team felt that the aviation operations were professional, safe and effective. The people we contacted were receptive and open to suggestion. Items that were identified by the team were rectified in a timely manner. Areas of concern by the aviation team was the lack of a helibase manager for the Type I helicopters. The aviation team would like to acknowledge the professionalism of all involved, the communications have been excellent.

Ground Operations were also safe and effective for the most part. The issues that were covered above are important especially the issue of work-rest. The team felt that the problems found with work-rest were not a reflection of the two teams working the fire but a continuation of how firefighters have been operating in the past. The Thirtymile accident and the Prevention Plan associated with it now require us to adhere to the 2 to 1 work rest requirements. These two teams are working towards monitoring crews and individual times.

Overall the incident has, and is, being managed professionally. With efforts of everyone working together efficiency, safety and meeting fire objectives will only continue to improve.