

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

FOREST SERVICE

LAKE MOUNTAIN INCIDENT
FIRE SHELTER DEPLOYMENT
SALMON NATIONAL FOREST



TABLE OF CONTENT

		Page
1 -	Report Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations, Safety Officer, [REDACTED]	1
2 -	Statements	
	[REDACTED] Assistant Safety Officer	4
	[REDACTED] Crew Boss, NDF	6
	[REDACTED] Crew Boss, NDF	7
	[REDACTED] Contract Faller	8
	[REDACTED] Strike Team Leader (personal statement)	9
	[REDACTED] Information Officer	12
	[REDACTED], Division B Supervisor	13
3 -	Incident Action Plan 7/4/85, Day Operation	15
4 -	Incident Map	28

Incident Report
Deployment of Fire Shelters, 7/4/85
Lake Mtn. Incident (Fire), Salmon N.F., Idaho

On 7/4/85, at approximately 1730 hrs. a rapid moving fire front crossed the fire line on Division "B". The fire front was driven by unpredicted winds of 20-30 mph from the south. Four crews and two fallers deployed fire shelters. One engine crew remained in their engine, one tractor operator took shelter under his tractor, two overhead did not take shelter, they monitored the personnel in the shelters as the fire passed over. The incident occurred in two locations (see attached map). Both locations were in pre-designated safety zones. Persons involved and locations are as follows:

Site #1 - Division Boss [REDACTED] Midnight Sons Hotshots and Chena Hotshots this group was below the main fire front, in a safety zone and did not deploy shelters.

Site #2 - NDF crews (2) Falcon Green and Falcon Yellow. Two contract fallers. All deployed shelters.

Site #3 - Job Corps crews Trapper #4 and Trapper #5. One BLM Engine, one contract tractor with operator and two Strike Team Leaders. The two handcrews deployed shelters. The engine crew remained in the vehicle. The tractor operator dug a trench and stayed beneath the tractor. The Strike Team Leaders and one other person remained in the safety zone without shelters.

The Nevada Division of Forestry crews were Youth Wards 16 - 20 years old. Both crews were inexperienced in wildfire suppression.

Statements were taken from the following persons (attached).

1. Division Supervisor, [REDACTED]
2. Strike Team Leader [REDACTED]
3. NDF Crew Leaders
4. Contract Faller, [REDACTED]

The "B" Division's work plan for the shift was to construct line and hold. The first 20 chains of line from the top of Division B were tractor constructed. The handcrews were constructing line below the tractor. The engine crew was assisting with line holding on the upper portion of line. The Division Supervisor was flagging the handline to the bottom of the Division into Deep Creek. The two hotshot crews were with the Division Supervisor, ahead of the other crews. Unpredicted southerly winds had been steadily increasing for approximately 45 minutes prior to the incident. Safety zones had been discussed and identified prior to the increase in wind. Approximately 30 minutes prior to shelter deployment line overhead knew that the fire was working toward them and would probably bump their line. Air tankers had been requested and 4 helicopters were making water drops as the fire activity increased.

The Operations Chief was over the Division (helicopter) monitoring the situation. The Division Supervisor was located near the bottom of the Division walking uphill toward the Trapper and NDF crews. The NDF and Trapper crews made the decision to go to the designated safety zones when it became apparent that the fire was going to cross the line.

The Division Supervisor and the Midnight Sons and Chena Hotshots were down hill from the main fire front. They moved to a safety zone until the fire activity subsided, they were located at position #1 (see attached map).


The two NDF crews, Falcon Green and Falcon Yellow and two contract fallers moved to position #2 (see map) and deployed their shelters. The two fallers had only one fire shelter and had to share it. The main part of the fire front crossed the line just east of them uphill. This group received more heat and intensity than the other two groups. Several shelters were scorched, canteen and chain saw handle was melted.

The two Job Corps crews, Trapper #4 and #5; one BLM engine, one contract tractor and two Strike Team Leaders moved to position #3 (see map). The fire front passed down hill to the west of them. The two crews deployed shelters. The engine crew remained in the engine. The tractor operator made a trench and layed under the Cat. He did not deploy his shelter. The two Strike Team Leaders, (one was crew and on engine) did not deploy shelters. The monitored the crews safety and condition in the safety zone.

Conclusion: All personnel anticipated that the fire would bump or cross the line, but did not expect the erratic fire behavior; and high intensity of the fire front. Crews located at position #1 were relatively safe and below the head of the fire. The crews located at position #2 received the most heat and fire activity. They would probably have suffered some burns, and may have lost one or more persons due to panic without the deployment of shelters. The crews at position #3 received substancial heat but likely would have been OK without use of shelters as evidenced by the Strike Team Leaders. All crews would have had time to move to safer locations had they been aware of the fire intensity. More experienced crews and supervisors may have correctly read the situation and reacted accordingly.

Recommendations: Both the NDF and Job Corps crews were inadequately trained and inexperienced for their assignments on 7/4/85. Recommend that crews be evaluated annually before being designated category II, and that overhead teams be advised of any crews assigned to them that need training to additional experience. On 7/5/85 the Trapper crews were trained in the use of hand tools when a Division Supervisor discovered that they did not know the basics of tool use.

Overhead should also be evaluated periodically to ascertain if they lack training, experience or supervisory skills. Three quiet fire season with little opportunity to maintain skills may also have been a contributing factor to this near miss.


Safety Officer
Lake Mtn. Fire

Where: Lake Mountain Fire, Division B
Salmon National forest

When: July 4, 1985 1530 to 2030

Who: Two Nevada Division of Forestry Crews, 40 crewmen
Two Trapper crews, approximately 40 crewmen
One dozer operator
One Tractor Boss
Two Sawyers
One Strike Team Leader

What: The firefighters listed above, approximately 85 crewpeople and overhead, pulled and deployed their fire shelters while confronted by shifting, threatening fire behavior.

Why: High winds carried the fire around the fireline and then back through unburned fuels trapping the crewmen in a crown fire that advanced upslope preventing the crews escape.

How: As mentioned above, winds carried the fire upslope entrapping the crews in an area previously cleared by dozers as a Safe Area. Unburned "islands" of fuel (stands of conifers from 25 feet to 40 feet high and associated deadfall) heated up in the canyon bottom, gained heat and momentum changed direction from northeast to east and trapped the crews.

Narrative


The following information was obtained in an interview with Nevada Division of Forestry crew bosses Scott Duncan and Lespade. These men were two of the four crew bosses working with the NDF crews. The following information was given freely and agreed as to time, place and disposition of the fire situation. Interviews were conducted on July 4, Thursday evening, at approximately 2100 hours and on July 5, Friday morning at approximately 0900.

The crewmembers listed above were working the day shift on Division B. They were strung out (downhill, west aspice) along the hill working from the rockslide to the (Deep) Creek.

At approximately 1530 to 1600 winds began to stir things up. Fire seemed to increase from two sides. Winds carried fire across their handline north into unburned acreage and then shifting winds blew both northeast and east. The ensuing buildup and strong winds created what Duncan and Lespade called a "fireball" forcing all crewmembers to retreat into a widened dozer cleared "safe area". The dozer had earlier made eight passes (8 blades wide in anticipation of possible trouble).

As the fire crawled and ran uphill the dozer made three more passes to scrape away remaining fire fuels. It was within these three new passes that the crews waited the advancing fire. As the heat became intense and sparks/ash/smoke drove uphill, the crews felt the "safe area" dozer line was not enough to provide safety.

The crews entered their shelters at approximately 1730 to 1800 (there is some confusion as to the time), and remained there for approximately one hour.


Safety Officer
7/5/85

Fire Shelter Incident - Division B - Lake Mountain Fire - Salmon National Forest - July 4, 1985 as told to [REDACTED] - Safety Officer, by [REDACTED] Crew boss NDF.

The NDF crews were holding a handline on Division B from Deep Creek up towards the Ridge Road to the east. At about 1400 the wind began to pick up. About 1600 the crew began picking up spots outside their line. From deep Creek to the west there was a section of the fire without any line. Along this portion the fire crept to the north. It began spotting across the creek creating a fire below and behind [REDACTED] crew. When [REDACTED] discovered what was happening he moved his crew of 22 people into the safety zone which was a large rock slide area. About this time a helicopter hovered overhead and radioed down for the crews to stay in the safety zone. [REDACTED] decided there was too much fuel to remain where he was so he moved the crew to a safer area. About this time the fire overran them and they went into their shelters. They remained inside the shelter for about an hour and fifteen minutes at which time the Division Supervisor came along and told them it was safe to come out. This occurred at about 2030. The crew then walked up to the road.

[REDACTED]
Safety Officer
Sawtooth N.F.

Fire Shelter Incident - Division B - Lake Mountain Fire - Salmon National Forest - July 4, 1985. As told to [REDACTED] Safety Officer by [REDACTED] - Crew boss - NDF Crew.

The NDF Crews were holding a handline on Division B from Deep Creek east towards the Ridge Road. [REDACTED] crew was in the bottom. [REDACTED] crew was above him and [REDACTED] crew was above [REDACTED]. At about 1600 the wind picked up causing spotting across the handline to the north. At about 1730 [REDACTED] called [REDACTED] and told him something was coming at him. [REDACTED] looked around and discovered that a spot fire below him and to north had blown up and that the fire was coming towards him and his crew. He told the crew and two contract sawyers to go the Safety Zone which was a large rock slide. On reaching the safety zone [REDACTED] discovered the fire was still coming so he ordered the crew and sawyers (16 people in all) into their fire shelters. When everyone was in their shelters [REDACTED] got into his. They stayed in the shelters for about an hour. When they came out of their shelters they discovered one of their plastic quart canteens had melted and one crew member complained of having one hot foot. No other damage occurred. [REDACTED] said the two contract sawyers had one shelter between them so they both got into the same shelter. The crew stayed in the safety zone until another crew came by at about 2030. At this time they worked out to the road with the other crew.

[REDACTED]
Safety Officer
Sawtooth N.F.

STATEMENT TAKEN 7/6/85 BY [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] talked to the driver who took [REDACTED] to town from base camp about 2400 July 4, 1985, these guys talked to the driver 2200 July 5, 1985. The driver was a BLM (Salmon) thinning crew member. The discussion was as follows:

[REDACTED] noticed erratic fire behavior. He located the nearest potential helispot where subsequently cut the spot. [REDACTED] had been project manager for Columbia Helicopters logging operations for 5-6 years). After cutting the spot [REDACTED] went to find someone with a radio. He found someone with a radio and asked to have 2 fallers and 1 supervisor removed via the helispot. The person with the radio requested removal but was denied. The estimate was there would still be 20 minutes to evacuate at the time of the request. There was a red (Jet Ranger I think) helicopter flying around this part of the fire adding to the erratic fire behavior with prop wash. The fallers tried to hold the fire back by dropping additional trees until the fire began to run. Then they went to the helispot. At the helispot they got into their shelter. [REDACTED] was sent to the line without a shelter so he got in with [REDACTED]. The three spent approximately 3 hours in the shelters. After getting out they observed melted canteens. Then they left the site for base camp and arrived late in camp and left camp around 2400 that same night for town.

22 or 2300 hours - [REDACTED] told me that he had been in the fire and had no fire blanket and he and one other person had to share a fire blanket. He said that when the fire went over the top of them he figured it was all over. That they were going to die. He told me when the fire had past over that his fire blanket was scorched and the water canteens were melted.

He also said that \$7.05 an hr was not worth being here for and he was going to town. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was in shock and was shaking and having trouble talking and walking.

[REDACTED]
7/6/85

Lake Mountain Fire

7/5/85

To: [REDACTED] Division Supervisor, Division "B"

Yesterday, July 4, I was assigned the Crew Strike Team Leader for Division B. The following are the circumstances relating to the deployment of approximately 90 fire shelters on Division B.

The following people were on the Division at the time:

- Chena Hotshot Crew > Holding Tractor Line
- Rising Sun Hotshot Crew >

- NDF Falcon Green > Holding handline (from dozer line to
- NDF Falcon Yellow > Deep Creek.)

- 3 engines (Only the Flamingo engine and crew at time of blow-up)
(Engine Strike Team Leader, Kaler)

- One tractor - tractor boss [REDACTED] and operator

- 2 sawyers and 3 swampers (only one sawyer and one swamper on line at time of blow-up)

We had held the Division with the help of helicopter water drops until about 1730 hrs., when hard, erratic winds caused spotting up and down the line. The spots could not be controlled, so crews and equipment were moved to pre-arranged safety zones. The NDF Yellow, and 2 squads of the NDF Green Crews, with Crew Boss Rielly, moved to gentle-sloping rockslides near the handline. The two sawyers were with them. The remainder moved to a dozer constructed clearing about 2/3 the way down the dozer line (about 200 x 200 ft.). Those at that location were: myself; the two hotshot crews; one squad of the Falcon Green crew with Crew Boss [REDACTED]; the tractor, Tractor Boss [REDACTED], and operator; and the Flamingo engine, crew, and Strike Team Leader, [REDACTED]. The tractor enlarged the area, which had been originally constructed around 1400 hrs., adjacent to the tractor line. The engine was parked a safe distance from the down-wind (uphill) side of the cleared area. I instructed the crew leaders to review the deployment of the fire shelters with their people, in case they needed to use them. I also told the dozer operator and the others to review this. I told them not to deploy them unless they had to. I had them cover their nose and mouth with a cloth, and put their gloves on, fasten the top shirt button, and sit facing the oncoming fire with hardhats on and faces down. I instructed them not to get excited, and under no circumstances to leave the crew and cleared area.

The fire began it's run up our right side (North). It got uncomfortably hot for some of the people near that side. They calmly moved away from the edge. While the north side was burning very intensely, the south side caught fire, the smoke was so heavy by this time that we could hardly see the flames at times. While the sides were both burning, the west (bottom) edge caught, the heat immediately became very intense. Several people began to deploy shelters, and all the others followed. Most people were under the shelters in about 30 seconds. I would say all were deployed within 45 seconds. Two members of the engine crew sat in the truck. Two others and myself didn't deploy shelters. Dozer Boss [redacted] had dug a trench and took shelter in it.


I wanted to be able to control the crew members if I had to. Twice, I was able to circulate among the shelters, and talk to everyone, with a cloth over my face (once shortly after deployment, and again when the fuels burned from around us enough to reduce the heat). Everyone seemed calm. The fire got very hot at times - I was forced to stand behind the engine for much of the time. The heat and smoke was intense enough to keep everyone in the shelter for 2 hours (approximately 1800 - 2000 hours). Others stayed in for 3-3 1/2 hours to avoid the smoke, dust, and high winds. Even after the fire had burned all four sides of the cleared area, we experienced very hot blasts of air from fire outside our area, with winds up to about 50 mph. After about two hours in the shelters, we took a roll call to be sure everyone was OK. We had to flush the tractor operators eyes, because of the dust and smoke.

The crews in the rock slides below went through the same experience, but much worse in the case of about 20 people including the faller and swamper with [redacted], Asst. Falcon Green Crew Leader. The clearing they were in was of marginal size. The shelters probably saved their lives. One shelter was scorched yellow. Plastic canteens and one persons shoelaces melted, where they touched the shelter. The sawyer's chainsaw handle (rubber cover) melted, where it touched the shelter. Small pine tree (1' - 2' ft.) near shelters were brown and deformed by the heat and wind.

It is my opinion that the deployment of all the shelters was necessary. At my location, I don't think the panic of some crew members could have been controlled, if they hadn't been in shelters. I think we would have also had some cases of smoke illness and burns from sparks and radiant heat. I experienced a sunburn-like burn on my face, which still burns some, a day later.

Many people, especially in the small rock slides, praised the shelters. They feel they saved their lives. Two of the sawyers, (one of whom was in the blow-up), and one swamper, quit the fire when they got to camp. They said it was the most afraid they have ever been. They said they got cramps trying to hold the shelter down in high winds for so long, but felt they saved their lives.

It is apparent now, that we should have left the line sooner, but crew bosses felt they could hold their areas with continued water drops. The sudden increase in winds caused the very sudden fire behavior change.


Ashley N.F.

Shelter Deployment

7/5/85

1. Two NDF Crews Shelter Deploy
2. Trapper Creek 4 and 5 Shelter Deploy

From Ashley N.F. - Don Oman - Strike Team Leader
Two sawyers - Shelter Deploy
Cat operator - Shelter Deploy
Dozer Boss - Shelter Deploy
Pumper Crew (5) Shelter Deploy Flame N. Co.

Approximately 100

In [REDACTED]'s mind need for shelters was evident, extreme heat and smoke, winds - stayed in shelter about two hours and some longer. Mainly stayed in for dust, heat and smoke. Upper crew in rock slides had canteens melt next to shelters; Sawyers rubber handle on saw melted. [REDACTED] feels they "would have died without shelters". Could hardly hold down shelters in the wind. Sawyers left incident and said "they have families to raise and they weren't going to die." Helicopters were good in calming troops (Operations Chief or whoever). Don didn't use shelter as he didn't know how kids were going to react. (16 to 18 year old lads with NPF). Had handkerchief over face due to smoke. Got behind pumper a couple of times to get out of fire blasts. Shelter's were not deployed until heat was really intense. Don told crew bosses to review shelter deployment prior to their needs and when needed were rapidly and correctly deployed.

[REDACTED]
Information Officer - Statement taker
7/5/85 at 0620

Statement concerning shelter incident
Lake Mt. Fire Idaho

7/11/85

Assignment for 7/4/85 on the fire was to construct fireline from ridge road west down to Deep Creek. I flew a recon the day before to become familiar with the area. The night before I talked to both Hotshot Crew Bosses about the assignment of downhill line construction, they were both OK with this assignment.

After the morning briefing I told both hotshot crews to come on out to the drop point and I would be out ahead of them scouting fireline. At the morning briefing I assigned [REDACTED] to tie in with the other crews and get them lined out and to report to the drop point. I scouted the fireline edge from ridge road to top of some Tallus rock slide, a point where I figured the Cat line would stop. From this point I would be constructing direct line with the two hotshot crews. I also noticed numerous Tallus rock areas about 50% rock and 50% timber. I called the hotshots and instructed them to start line construction where I had flagged.

Continuing down the slope I called Strike Team Leader [REDACTED] and asked him to get the Cat started down while he was up there. I then ordered for an engine or two to work the road and mop up the north burned edge of the fire. [REDACTED] worked with the Cat, engines and fallers for awhile and then requested a Strike Team Leader for the engines to free him up; this was accomplished.

We continued to construct direct line from Tallus to Tallus and hold the line behind us with the help of water drops.

In the late afternoon 1500 to 1600 we needed to construct fireline up and over a ridge and then drop down into Deep Creek. I asked Don Ohman to bump Reillys crew down to where the hotshots were. I left one hotshot crew there to brief them; then pulled both hotshots to the base of the ridge. The crew took a short break for lunch as their Crew Boss started flagging fireline to the ridge top. When he returned we discussed direct or indirect line up over the ridge and decided on indirect line that we would fire from the top down after construction as winds all day had been upslope toward the southeast.

Both Crew Bosses discussed with crews that the fireline would be their escape route. We started line construction to the top of the ridge, as the sawyers neared the top of the ridge the fire became more active on the back side. The Operations Chief ordered a couple of air drops to cool the fire until we could get under the hot area with the line. About the same time I ordered and received a sling load of water and gas to help us finish the line on into Deep Creek.

It was about 1700 when active fire on the ridge began picking up, also at this time [REDACTED], Crew Boss for NDF Yellow Crew, and [REDACTED] began requesting more water drops and also an air tanker in the area started talking to [REDACTED] and made a drop in [REDACTED]'s area. I let this continue as I felt it was important to hold the established line behind us. At this point the fire became very active on the ridge top heading in our direction I pulled both hotshot crews back down the line into a large Tallus rock area. The winds picked up, intensity increased, and the fire seemed to spread to one place and another place. At this point the Operations Chief was in the and worried if we were OK. I acknowledge on the radio we were in a safe place. He then talked to [REDACTED] who was very worried and wanted to move. [REDACTED] stated he was in some rocks, it was getting warm and sounded unsure of himself. [REDACTED], Ops advised him to stay where he was it may get warm and smokey but he would be OK in the rocks. He replied he was getting in his shelter. I believe [REDACTED] Crew Boss for NDF Falcon Green and some fallers were working several hundred feet behind [REDACTED]'s crew without a radio. Also at this time Strike Team Leader, [REDACTED] was 1/4 to 1/3 mile from Ridge Road working the Cat and Trapper 4 and Trapper 5 crews. I contacted [REDACTED] and he said they were all in a clear area (see [REDACTED] Statement). We all sat it out for an hour or two and I continued to check with [REDACTED] reassuring him and telling him to stay in place and that the two hotshot crews and myself would be up to see him and lead him out.

When things finally cooled down we hiked up to [REDACTED] crew and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] crew followed the hotshots back up to ridge road. The fallers I believe split earlier. Also, [REDACTED] group went on back to Ridge Road. From there we all returned to camp.

[REDACTED]
Division Supervisor
Division B

INCIDENT OBJECTIVES	1. INCIDENT NAME LAKE MTN. FIRE	2. DATE PREPARED 7/3/85	3. TIME PREPARED 2130									
4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD (DATE/TIME) 7/4 0600-1800												
5. GENERAL CONTROL OBJECTIVES FOR THE INCIDENT (INCLUDE ALTERNATIVES)												
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Do not permit fire spread east or south of the Salmon Ridge Road (FS 020) West of the Pepper Creek Ridge Jeep Trail, and an East-West line connecting Pepper Creek Ridge Trail and the Salmon Ridge Road which bisects Sections 5, 8, 9, 10, 15, 15, 16, 17, 18 2. Minimize flying exposures where possible 												
6. WEATHER FORECAST FOR OPERATIONAL PERIOD												
See attached fire weather report												
7. GENERAL/SAFETY MESSAGE												
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. TURN IN ALL RADIOS FOR SERVICING 2. READ SAFETY MESSAGE 3. WATER TENDERS TO WATER CAMP ROAD 4. 4 AIR TANKERS AVAILABLE - PRIORITY DIV. A 												
8. ATTACHMENTS (IF ATTACHED)												
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. NEED AIR ATTACK OVER FIRE AT 0800 HRS. OR EARLIER <table border="0"> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ORGANIZATION LIST (ICS 203)</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL PLAN (ICS 206)</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AIR OPERATIONS</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DIVISION ASSIGNMENT LISTS (ICS 204)</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> INCIDENT MAP</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FIRE WEATHER</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COMMUNICATIONS PLAN (ICS 205)</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> TRAFFIC PLAN</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SAFETY MESSAGE</td> </tr> </table>				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ORGANIZATION LIST (ICS 203)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL PLAN (ICS 206)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AIR OPERATIONS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DIVISION ASSIGNMENT LISTS (ICS 204)	<input type="checkbox"/> INCIDENT MAP	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FIRE WEATHER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COMMUNICATIONS PLAN (ICS 205)	<input type="checkbox"/> TRAFFIC PLAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SAFETY MESSAGE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ORGANIZATION LIST (ICS 203)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL PLAN (ICS 206)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AIR OPERATIONS										
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DIVISION ASSIGNMENT LISTS (ICS 204)	<input type="checkbox"/> INCIDENT MAP	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FIRE WEATHER										
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COMMUNICATIONS PLAN (ICS 205)	<input type="checkbox"/> TRAFFIC PLAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SAFETY MESSAGE										
202 ICS 3/80	9. PREPARED BY (PLANNING SECTION CHIEF) W.D. Boland	10. APPROVED BY (INCIDENT COMMANDER) J. E. ...										

ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT LIST

LAKE MTN. FIRE 7/3/85 2130

POSITION	NAME
5. INCIDENT COMMANDER AND STAFF	
INCIDENT COMMANDER	JIM STUMPF
DEPUTY	
SAFETY OFFICER	DAN SWEARINGIN
INFORMATION OFFICER	ELLIOT GRAHAM
LIAISON OFFICER	

4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD (DATE/TIME)
7/4 0600-1800

6. AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES	
AGENCY	NAME

9. OPERATIONS SECTION	
CHIEF	BOB WILCOX
DEPUTY	
a. BRANCH I - DIVISIONS/GROUPS	
BRANCH DIRECTOR	
DEPUTY	
DIVISION/GROUP	A CRAIG WORKMAN
DIVISION/GROUP	B RON LINEBARG
DIVISION/GROUP	C BILL ADAMS
DIVISION/GROUP	D K. ROGER
DIVISION/GROUP	

7. PLANNING SECTION	
CHIEF	BOB
DEPUTY	
RESOURCES UNIT	RICK
SITUATION UNIT	BOE
DOCUMENTATION UNIT	
DEMOBILIZATION UNIT	
TECHNICAL SPECIALISTS	FIRE BEHAVIOR

Do Not Copy

b. BRANCH II - DIVISIONS/GROUPS	
BRANCH DIRECTOR	
DEPUTY	
DIVISION/GROUP	
DIVISION/GROUP	
DIVISION/GROUP	
DIVISION/GROUP	
DIVISION/GROUP	

8. LOGISTICS SECTION	
CHIEF	NICK REEVES
DEPUTY	
a. SUPPORT BRANCH	
DIRECTOR	
SUPPLY UNIT	KATHY REMLEY
FACILITIES UNIT	KARL ROGGE
GROUND SUPPORT UNIT	JOHN CESSNA
b. SERVICE BRANCH	
DIRECTOR	
COMMUNICATIONS UNIT	BILL OTT
MEDICAL UNIT	
FOOD UNIT	

BRANCH III - DIVISIONS/GROUPS	
BRANCH DIRECTOR	
DEPUTY	
DIVISION/GROUP	
DIVISION/GROUP	
DIVISION/GROUP	
DIVISION/GROUP	
DIVISION/GROUP	

d. AIR OPERATIONS BRANCH	
AIR OPERATIONS BR. DIR.	RAY MORROW
AIR ATTACK SUPERVISOR	ROD WELLS
AIR SUPPORT SUPERVISOR	DAVE BACON
HELICOPTER COORDINATOR	
AIR TANKER COORDINATOR	

203 ICS 1/82

PREPARED BY (RESOURCES UNIT)

Don Truck

SAFETY MESSAGE

DAY SHIFT 7/4/85

HAZARD

PREVENTIVE ACTIONS

AIR OPERATIONS

MAINTAIN good communications BETWEEN ALL AIRCRAFT. INFLUENCE PERSONNEL OF RETARDANT DROP AND CLIMB. CHECK INSTRUCTIONS

DOWN HILL LINE CONST.

FOLLOW ALL SAFETY PRECEDENCE REGULATING THIS TECHNIQUE. DON'T TAKE CHANCES AND PLAN SAFETY ISLANDS & ESCAPE ROUTES WELL IN ADVANCE OF WORK

ROLLING ROCKS AND FALLING SNAGS

KEEP PERSONNEL ADEQUATELY SPACED, POST LOCK-OUTS AND MAINTAIN A BROADS-UP POSTURE

FIRE BEHAVIOR

CONTINUALLY WATCH FOR FIRE & WEATHER INDICATORS. EXPECT SPOTTING, FIRE RUNS & PANIC ACCORDINGLY

TRANSPORTATION

HEADLIGHTS ON DAY & NIGHT. DRIVE FOR EXCEPTIONS, SLOW DOWN TO ENSURE AN EXTRA MARGIN OF SAFETY

SAFETY OFFICERS; DAN SWEARINGIN & JIM CAFFEY

MEDICAL PLAN	1. INCIDENT NAME LAKE MTN. FIRE	2. DATE PREPARED 7/3/85	3. TIME PREPARED 2330	4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD 7/4 0600-1800
---------------------	---	-----------------------------------	---------------------------------	---

5. INCIDENT MEDICAL AID STATIONS			
MEDICAL AID STATIONS	LOCATION	PARAMEDICS	
		YES	NO
First medical station set up at fire camp	Lake Mtn Fire Camp Don Smith and Tom Bond		NO

6. TRANSPORTATION				
A. AMBULANCE SERVICES				
NAME	ADDRESS	PHONE	PARAMEDICS	
			YES	NO
Salmon Ambulance	Salmon, Idaho E.M.T.s on board unless otherwise requested	756-420		NO

B. INCIDENT AMBULANCES			
NAME	LOCATION	PARAMEDICS	
		YES	NO
Life Flight Helicopter	Missoula, Montana	X	
" " "	Pocatello, Idaho	X	
F.M.S. Helicopter	Mt. Home Airforce Base, Idaho	X	

7. HOSPITALS								
NAME	ADDRESS	TRAVEL TIME		PHONE	HELIPAD		BURN CENTER	
		AIR	GRND		YES	NO	YES	NO
		St. Memorial	Salmon, Idaho		15 min	1	756-2424	X
St. Patrick's	Missoula, Mont	1	4		X		X	
Consolidated	Idaho Falls, Idaho	1	4		X		X	

8. MEDICAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

In a head injury or call communications and an E.M.T. will come out on the line and make a determination on how to move.

In a critical injury or sickness we have a 206 standing by to assist. The victims are, in a non-critical situation the patient would be taken by truck to Salmon.

206 ICS 8/78	9. PREPARED BY (MEDICAL UNIT LEADER) Donald E. Smith	10. REVIEWED BY (SAFETY OFFICER) [Signature]
--------------	--	--

Boise Fire Weather
Forecaster: Carl Gorski

Forecast 4
Lake Mt Fire
Wed July 3, 1985
2000 Mit

Weather Discussion.....Moisture from old hurricane Dolores is being entrained in the southwesterly flow which covers the Western U.S.. This moisture is showing up tonight in the form of high cirrus clouds over the central Idaho mountains. So far all down stream stations have only reported high level moisture(Northern California, Southeastern Oregon), with no precipitation. However, surface dew points across southwestern Idaho are on the rise which increases threat of thunderstorm activity over the mountainous terrain. Moisture limited, so if thunderstorm activity does develop they will be dry. Air mass becomes more unstable and begins to cool down on Friday.

FORECAST FOR DAY SHIFT.....THURSDAY.....

.....Red Flag Watch for dry lightning late Thursday afternoon.....

Sky/weather conditions.....Increasing high cloudiness. Slight chance of dry lightning late thursday afternoon and evening.

Temperatures.....Temperatures dropping a few degrees due to an increase in cloud cover. Maximum temperatures near 76 at 8500 feet and near 80 at 7500 feet. Morning inversions should again reverse temps with temps at sunrise near 54 at 8500 feet and 49 at 7500. Surface inversions should break between 1300 to 1500adt.

Humidity.....on a slow upswing. Morning minimums range in mid 40s at 8500 feet and mid 50s at 7500. Minimum afternoon rhts range 27 to 32 percent both at top and bottom.

Winds.....An increase in southwesterly ridge winds becoming 6 to 10 mph afternoon with few higher gusts to 14 mph. Slope winds again play a dominate role during morning and early afternoon hours. southerly facing slopes again 8 to 12 mph with higher gusts to 20 mph. Chance of gusty winds to 30 mph if thunderstorms develop near fire site.

.....

Outlook for Friday.....Cooler and windier. Greater chance of Thunderstorms.

INCIDENT RADIO COMMUNICATIONS PLAN

1. INCIDENT NAME

LAKE MT.

PREPARED

7/3/85 Z1000h

DATE/TIME 7/4 0600Hes
7/4 1800 Hes


4. BASIC RADIO CHANNEL UTILIZATION

SYSTEM/CACHE	CHANNEL	FUNCTION	FREQUENCY	ASSIGNMENT	REMARKS
BIFC	1	TAC/Line	166.725	Div - A	
BIFC	2	TAC/Line	166.775	Div - B Div - C	
BIFC	3	Free line to Aircraft	168.250	All Div	
BIFC	4	TAC/Line	168.400	Div - D	
BIFC	5	Channel to ICB	T 166.125 R 168.400	Overhead to overhead Line. To overhead	*Command Net
BIEC	6	Reserved	167.100		
ATFC	7	ICB to Salmon Free Disp	T 169.750 R 167.100	USE by ICB only	
BIFC	8	Air Guard	168.550	Air to Air Guard	

5. PREPARED BY (COMMUNICATIONS UNIT)

205 ICS 8/78

Bill OTT



- XXXX COMPLETED DOZER LINE
- X..X..X PROPOSED DOZER LINE
- DP-2 DROP POINT #2
- X DIVISION LINE
- OO SPOT FIRES
- Fire Line symbol FIRE LINE


STAGING AREA 7-3 2300 K3X

LEESBURG NW

27 to provide standard
 converted from USGS 15-minute quad



LOCATION OF OVERHEAD
CREWS ON DIVISION B
114755 DURING DEPLOYMENT
OF FIRE SHIELDS ON THE
LAKE MTN FIRE, SALMON, N.H. 1045



- ③ ST. DON O'HANES GROUP, TROPIC GROUP
- ② REILLY & DOWNING, NDR CREWS
- ① MIDNIGHT SONS FIRE SHIELD CHINA HILLS DIVISION BOSS

RANGER

COBALT SALMON

DAMP

1961

33

33

33

33

33

33

33