

After Action Review

BOISE NATIONAL FOREST

Incident Name: Lookout # 023

Date: 6/25/02

Class: B

CREW: _____

IC: Terry Leatherman

Participants:

- | | | |
|----------------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1. Terry Leatherman | 8. _____ | 15. _____ |
| 2. Sean Petersen | 9. _____ | 16. _____ |
| 3. C-41 | 10. _____ | 17. _____ |
| 4. | 11. _____ | 18. _____ |
| 5. Mark Bingman – D4 | 12. _____ | 19. _____ |
| 6. Ronn Julian DR | 13. _____ | 20. _____ |
| 7. _____ | 14. _____ | 21. _____ |

The purpose of this critique is to identify any areas where the Fire Orders, the 18 Fire Situations That Shout Watch Out, or LCES may not have been given proper consideration during the incident.


Comment where applicable.

Critique Leader Signature R F Julian

Date 6/25/02

Reviewed By: _____ Date _____

Diagram of fire:



After Action Review

What was planned?

Review the primary objectives and expected action plan.

Control fire without additional spread

What actually happened?

Review the day's actions:

- Identify and discuss effective and non-effective performance.

Good initial size-up by IA IC Sean Petersen (boundary fire between SITPA and USFS protection responsibility).

Fire was located just under brow of hill below lookout. Good access to fire via vehicle.

High wind velocity during IA was producing short range spotting. The L.O. was centered on the hill well away from any dry fuels but was in direct path of embers. One fire brand apparently made its way into unscreened ventilator pipe in basement of L.O., causing internal ignition.

Upon discovering L.O. was on fire, IA IC did not attempt to extinguish fire. This was the appropriate decision as the internal building was near fully involved at the time of discovery.

- Identify barriers that were encountered and how they were handled.

Mixing of SITPA and USFS crews was handled well by IA IC and posed no problems.

Communications were dialed in.

- Discuss all actions that were not standard operation procedure, or those that presented safety problems.

Hotline transition and change of IC's was not discussed with FMO nor Ranger. Transition was handled well. All personnel were pulled from line and briefed.

IC Leatherman was dual tasking as a lookout.

A second start was known and was located downslope approximately ½ mile. It was unstaffed.

All crew members and firefighters did not have a copy of the pocket guide in their possession. Most did not have a copy of the BI card for the Boise National Forest – north zone. There were a few firefighters who were wearing KEVLAR firepants (not approved).

Why did it happen?

Discuss the reasons for ineffective or unsafe performance. Concentrate on WHAT, not WHO, is right.

IC transition occurred because AFMO felt loss of lookout was sensitive issue and He felt responsibility for IA should rest w/higher qualified IC.

Second start downslope was staffed by C-41. They did recon the fire with a helicopter and used lookout to approach fire from upslope.

What can we do next time?

Determine lessons learned and how to apply them in the future.

If a transition in IC's is being contemplated, be certain all are informed prior to transition.

Site did have cell phone coverage.

IC should dedicate a lookout.

FIRE ORDERS

OBSERVED	NOT OBSERVED	FIRE ORDERS
X		F. Fight fire aggressively but provide for safety first.
X		I. Initiate all action based on current and expected fire behavior.
X		R. Recognize current weather conditions and obtain forecasts.
X		E. Ensure instructions are given and understood.
X		O. Obtain current information on fire status.
X		R. Remain in communication with crew members, your supervisor and adjoining forces.
X		D. Determine safety zones and escape routes.
X		E. Establish lookouts in potentially hazardous situations.
X		R. Retain control at all times.
X		S. Stay alert, keep calm, think clearly, act decisively.

18 FIRE SITUATIONS THAT SHOUT "WATCH OUT"

OBSERVED	NOT OBSERVED	SITUATION
X		1. Fire not scouted and sized up.
X		2. In country not seen in daylight.
X		3. Safety zones and escape routes not identified.
X		4. Unfamiliar with weather and local factors influencing fire behavior.
X		5. Uninformed on strategy, tactics and hazards.
X		6. Instructions and assignments not clear.
X		7. No communication link with crew members/supervisor.
X		8. Constructing line without safe anchor point.
X		9. Building fireline downhill with fire below.
X		10. Attempting frontal assault on fire.
X		11. Unburned fuel between you and the fire.
X		12. Cannot see main fire, not in contact with anyone who can.
X		13. On a hillside where rolling material can ignite fuel below.
X		14. Weather is getting hotter and drier.
X		15. Wind increases and/or changes direction.
X		16. Getting frequent spot fires across line.
X		17. Terrain and fuels make escape to safety zones difficult.
X		18. Taking a nap near the fireline.

LCES

ELEMENT	FEATURE	YES	NO
<i>LOOKOUTS</i>	EXPERIENCED/COMPETENT/TRUSTED	X	
	ENOUGH LOOKOUTS AT GOOD VANTAGE POINTS		X
	KNOWLEDGE OF CREW LOCATIONS	X	
	KNOWLEDGE OF ESCAPE AND SAFETY LOCATIONS	X	
	KNOWLEDGE OF DISENGAGEMENT TRIGGER POINTS	X	
	MAP/WEATHER KIT/WATCH/IAP	X	
<i>COMMUNICATIONS</i>	RADIO FREQUENCIES CONFIRMED	X	
	BACKUP PROCEDURES AND CHECK-IN TIMES ESTABLISHED	X	
	PROVIDE UPDATED ON ANY SITUATION CHANGE	X	
	SOUND ALARM EARLY, NOT LATE	X	
<i>ESCAPE ROUTES</i>	MORE THAN ONE ESCAPE ROUTE	X	
	AVOID UPHILL ESCAPE ROUTES	X	
	SCOUTED: LOOSE SOILS/ROCKS/VEGETATION	X	
	TIMED: SLOWEST PERSON/FATIGUE AND TEMPERATURE FACTORS	X	
	MARKED: FLAGGED FOR DAY OR NIGHT	X	
	EVALUATE: ESCAPE TIME VS. RATE OF SPREAD	X	
	VEHICLES PARKED FOR ESCAPE	X	
<i>SAFETY ZONES</i>	SURVIVABLE WITHOUT A FIRE SHELTER	X	
	BACK INTO CLEAN BURN	X	
	NATURAL FEATURES: ROCK AREAS/WATER/MEADOWS	X	
	CONSTRUCTED SITES: CLEARCUTS/ROADS/HELISPOTS	X	
	SCOUTED FOR SIZE AND HAZARDS	X	
	LARGER SAFETY ZONE: UPSLOPE/DOWNWIND/HEAVY FUELS	X	